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EXCEPTIONS, AND STIGMATIC INJURY 
Jessica E. Rank∗
 
 
De minimis non curat lex: the law does not concern itself with trifles.1
 
 
On June 17, 1998, David Gillespie sought free admission into the 
Coastline Restaurant (“Coastline”) in Cherry Hill, New Jersey.2  It was 
“Ladies’ Night” at Coastline, and the bar offered free admission and 
reduced prices to women, while men were charged a five-dollar cover 
charge and regular prices for drinks.3  Mr. Gillespie requested to be 
charged the discounted price, but because he was not a woman, his 
request was accordingly denied.4  He paid the five-dollar cover charge 
and entered the bar.5  Five days later, Mr. Gillespie filed a complaint 
with the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights, alleging that Coastline 
had engaged in impermissible reverse discrimination in violation of 
his rights under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”), 
a public accommodations statute.6
In June 2004, the Division on Civil Rights agreed with Mr. 
Gillespie.  Although finding that the “minimal differences between 
the men’s charge . . . and the women’s [charge] . . . do not constitute 
the kind of ‘personal hardships’ or ‘menaces [to] the institutions and 
foundation of a free democratic State’ to which the Legislature 
intended the LAD to apply,” the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2001, 
Trinity College. 
 1 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (8th ed. 2004). 
 2 Gillespie v. J.C.B.C. Inc., No. CRT 2579-03, 2004 WL 1476932, at *1 (N.J. 
Admin. June 10, 2004). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -49 (West 2005). 
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nevertheless held that the discounts violated the LAD because the 
LAD did not provide for a de minimis defense to discrimination.7
The decision by the Division on Civil Rights sparked controversy 
and a national,8 as well as international,9 media backlash to the 
proposition that ladies’ night is discriminatory towards men.  The 
Governor of New Jersey called the decision “bureaucratic 
nonsense,”10 and he advised the State Attorney General that the civil 
rights division had better things to do than consider an anti-ladies’ 
night claim.11
Subsequently, the New Jersey Legislature drafted a bill, currently 
pending in the State Senate, to amend the LAD to include a de 
minimis defense.12  The bill states that “[n]otwithstanding the 
provisions of the ‘Law Against Discrimination,’ . . . to the contrary, 
the holder of a plenary retail consumption license . . . may charge de 
minimis differential pricing for alcoholic beverages and offer other 
special discounts to patrons based on sex, provided that such pricing 
is for economic reasons only.”13
 7 Gillespie, 2004 WL 1476932, at *7 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 
2005)). 
 8 E.g., Steve Chapman, Editorial, Ladies’ nights and the “cancer of discrimination,” 
BALT. SUN, June 8, 2004, at 13A [hereinafter “Chapman, Editorial”] (“American 
history holds numerous examples of discrimination that are thoroughly malignant.  
This is not one of them . . . . There are no victims [here].”); DeWayne Wickham, 
“Ladies Night” Ban in NJ Sends the Wrong Message, USA TODAY, June 8, 2004, at 21A 
(arguing that public accommodation laws were enacted in response to mean-spirited, 
racist practices that stand in sharp contrast to ladies’ night); Jeffrey Page, Glasses of 
Scorn Raised to Ladies Night Killjoy, RECORD (NJ), June 9, 2004, at L1 (arguing that 
ladies’ night has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory economic motive).  “When there’s 
[lively] social interaction . . . patrons have a habit of returning even when it’s not 
ladies night.”  Id. 
 9 E.g., David Usborne, Pandora in America, INDEPENDENT (UK), June 14, 2004, at 
12; Elizabeth Hodgson, New Jersey Puts the Fizz Back Into Ladies Night, NATIONAL POST 
(Canada), June 19, 2004, at A15. 
 10 Charisse Jones, Many Scoff at N.J. Ruling Over “Ladies Nights,” USA TODAY, June 
4, 2004, at 3A. 
 11 Andrea Cecil, College Park Café Could Become First Place in Md. to Offer “Skirt 
Night,” DAILY RECORD (Baltimore), June 4, 2004. 
 12 A. 3005, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004). 
 13 Id. (June 14, 2004 reprint showing changes made by Assembly Judiciary 
Committee), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2004/Bills/A3500/3005_R1 
.htm.  The amendments made by the Assembly Judiciary Committee changed the 
term “different prices” to “de minimis differential pricing,” removed age as an 
exception to the differential pricing exceptions proposed by the bill, and added the 
last clause of the bill, stating that the pricing must be “for economic reasons only.”  
Id.  The Senate Judiciary Committee submitted a statement to clarify that age was 
removed from the bill because age, unlike sex, is not a prohibited category in the 
public accommodations statute, and thus the reference to age was “superfluous.”   
A. 3005, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (November 8, 2004 statement issued by the Senate 
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The statement of legislative purpose, which accompanied the 
bill, explained the intent behind the bill: 
This bill would allow bars and restaurants to offer free 
admission and discounted drink prices to female patrons on so-
called “ladies nights.”  Specifically, the bill authorizes holders of a 
plenary retail consumption license to charge different prices for 
alcoholic beverages and offer other special discounts to patrons 
based on gender . . . . 
The Director of the Division on Civil Rights recently held that 
a restaurant offering gender-based priced differentials was in 
violation of the State Law Against Discrimination (LAD).  The 
purpose of this bill is to clarify that such price differentials do not 
constitute discrimination under the LAD. 
In the highly competitive bar and restaurant business, 
establishments which sponsor theme nights, such as “Ladies 
Night” or “Mens Night,” clearly have a legitimate commercial goal 
of increasing patronage.  Such de minimis price differentials 
should not be construed as gender . . . discrimination.14
Gender-based pricing has been a source of debate in our 
country,15 and the issue is complicated further by the lack of a 
national standard to address gender discrimination claims.  The 
United States did not include sex as a protected class in Title II of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,16 which is the federal public 
accommodations law.17  In addition, allegations of gender-based 
pricing often arise from the actions of private businesses, and as such 
are not subject to the “state action” doctrine under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.18  Gender discrimination in places of public 
accommodation is, therefore, largely an issue left to the states.  In this 
Judiciary Committee), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2004/Bills/A3500/ 
3005_S2.pdf;  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2005). 
 14 A. 3005, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (June 10, 2004 introduction of bill in 
Assembly), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2004/Bills/A3500/3005_I1.htm. 
 15 See, e.g., Civil Rights — Gender Discrimination — California Prohibits Gender-Based 
Pricing — Cal. Civ. Code. S 51.6 (West Supp. 1996), 109 HARV. L. REV. 1839, 1839 (1996) 
(“Differential pricing of services is one of America’s last remaining vestiges of formal 
gender-based discrimination.”); Joyce L. McClements & Cheryl J. Thomas, Public 
Accommodations Statutes: Is Ladies’ Night Out?, 37 MERCER L. REV. 1605, 1618 (1986); 
Heidi C. Paulson, Ladies’ Night Discounts: Should We Bar Them or Promote Them?,  
32 B.C. L. REV. 487, 528 (1991) (arguing that ladies’ night promotions encourage 
paternalistic attitudes toward women and encourage stereotypes of both men and 
women). 
 16 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000). 
 17 Id. 
 18 See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) (holding that 
the granting of a liquor license to a private club is not sufficient state action to 
implicate the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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absence of a national standard, many states have enacted “public 
accommodations statutes” to ensure free and equal access to 
accommodations.19  Cases related to sex-based price differentials are 
generally brought under such statutes.20  Public accommodation 
statutes vary from state to state in terms of breadth of coverage and 
the degree to which courts will enforce their requirements.21
The issue of gender-based pricing has generated a split of 
opinion among the courts in how to interpret their respective public 
accommodations statutes.22  California,23 Florida,24 Pennsylvania,25 
Iowa,26 and Maryland27 have taken an all-or-nothing approach to 
interpreting their respective anti-discrimination laws.  These states do 
not analyze price discrimination in terms of degree, but instead have 
held that any gender-based price discrimination, regardless of severity 
or motivation, is illegal.28  In contrast, Illinois,29 Washington,30 and 
 19 See Marissa L. Goodman, Note: A Scout is Morally Straight, Brave, Clean, 
Trustworthy . . . and Heterosexual? Gays in the Boy Scouts of America, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
825, 829 (1999) (“Over the years, state public accommodation laws, rather than 
federal public accommodation laws, have been the more effective tool in combating 
discrimination.”). 
 20 See infra notes 39–108 and accompanying text. 
 21 Goodman, supra note 19, at 830 (“The breadth of state public accommodation 
laws varies depending upon legislative definitions and judicial interpretations of what 
constitutes a public accommodation.”). 
 22 See infra notes 39–47 and accompanying text. 
 23 Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195, 204 (Cal. 1985) (barring a 
promotional car wash discount to women under California’s Unruh Act). 
 24 City of Clearwater v. Studebaker’s Dance Club, 516 So.2d 1106, 1109 (Fla. App. 
1987) (holding that club policy of allowing women into “Pink Ladies’ Club” at a bar, 
which was a special membership that included discounted drink prices, was in 
violation of local anti-discrimination ordinances). 
 25 Pa. Liquor Control Bd. v. Dobrinoff, 471 A.2d 941, 943 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984) 
(holding that the practice of admitting women into “go-go bar” for free while 
charging men one dollar was in violation of the Human Relations Act). 
 26 Ladd v. Iowa W. Racing Ass’n, 438 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Iowa 1989) (holding that 
because the Iowa Civil Rights Act did not provide de minimis defense based on 
legitimate purpose, the practice of admitting women into a racetrack at a reduced 
admission price violated the Act). 
 27 Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, 506 A.2d 263, 267 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) 
(affirming panel decision that “Skirt and Gown Night” discount violated the Human 
Relations Act because it was “discriminatory subterfuge” and merely an extension of 
ladies’ night). 
 28 See infra notes 48–80 and accompanying text. 
 29 The Dock Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm’n., 428 N.E.2d 735, 738  
(Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that the Illinois Dramshop Act’s anti-discrimination 
provision barred only conduct that prohibited patronage, and thus discounts to 
women did not violate the Act because discounts were intended to encourage female 
patronage, rather than discourage male patronage). 
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Michigan31 have engaged in a balancing of the alleged discrimination 
with the motivations behind it and the likely effects.  These states 
have found no actionable discrimination where the price-based 
discount was not accompanied by an improper motive to prohibit 
patronage by one sex or the other.32
New Jersey’s recent ruling is the first of its kind in any state for a 
number of years.  While the legal analysis comports with other states 
that have strictly construed public accommodations laws, the ensuing 
public backlash about a potential ban on ladies’ nights suggests that 
such strict construction may be misplaced.33  Allowing a de minimis 
exception to public accommodations statutes would serve an 
important efficiency purpose.34  The effort by the New Jersey 
Legislature in creating a de minimis exception demonstrates a 
willingness to allow for small exceptions to sexual discrimination laws 
in order to focus time and resources on remedying the more serious 
harms caused by sexual discrimination. 
This Comment proposes that sex-based differential pricing in 
the context of ladies’ night discounts should not be considered 
actionable sex discrimination under state public accommodations 
laws.  Part I of this Comment examines case law and legislation 
dealing with gender discrimination and further examines the 
treatment given to sex-based differential pricing in a number of states 
that have dealt with the issue.35  Part II provides a general overview of 
de minimis exceptions in other contexts.36  Part III discusses the 
 30 MacLean v. First Northwest Indus. of Am., 635 P.2d 683, 686 (Wash. 1981) 
(holding that a ladies’ night promotion sponsored by a professional basketball team 
was not violative of Washington’s LAD because complainant was not damaged, the 
discount had the legitimate purpose of increasing overall patronage, and such 
discounts were not the evils intended to be remedied by the statute). 
 31 Tucich v. Dearborn Indoor Racquet Club, 309 N.W.2d 615, 619 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1981) (holding that a lower membership fee charged to women was not 
violative of public accommodations statute because use of facilities was not being 
withheld from men); Magid v. Oak Park Raquet Club Ass’n, 269 N.W.2d 661, 663 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (same). 
 32 See infra notes 81–108 and accompanying text. 
 33 See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text. 
 34 Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong?  Biases, Preferences, 
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 203 (1992) (“The law . . . should not 
concern itself with all possible violations of moral rights, but should instead select for 
prohibition those broad types of discrimination that are most likely to be immoral, 
intrinsically or extrinsically, that are either likely to violate victims’ rights or to cause 
a great amount of social harm . . . and that are least costly to detect and establish in 
court.”). 
 35 See infra notes 39–108 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 109–75 and accompanying text. 
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concept of stigmatic injury and compares gender-based differential 
pricing with a total exclusion from a public accommodation, arguing 
that price differentials based on legitimate economic motives are not 
the “cancer of discrimination” sought to be remedied by public 
accommodations laws.37  Finally, Part IV concludes that nominal price 
differentials are, in fact, de minimis and should not constitute 
actionable gender discrimination.38
I. CASE LAW/LEGISLATION CONCERNING SEX-BASED PRICING 
The issue of sex discrimination in places of public 
accommodation is one that has been left to the states.  The federal 
public accommodations law, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
bans discrimination solely on the grounds of race, color, religion and 
national origin.39  The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, though invoked often in recent years to grant 
“intermediate scrutiny” to sex-based classifications,40 suffers a similar 
fate, since it too requires state action.41  An individual state, however, 
can reach both public and private behavior through legislation 
enacted under its “police power.”42  As a result, many states have 
enacted public accommodations statutes, which prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sex in public accommodations.43  
Interpretation of these statutes has varied among the states, and has 
resulted in a split of opinion specifically on the issue of sex-based 
differential pricing.44  Courts that have held gender-based differential 
pricing to violate public accommodations laws have almost universally 
recognized that no actual harm was caused to the plaintiff; despite 
this recognition, those courts have strictly construed the statutes to 
prohibit any type of discrimination, regardless of severity.45  In 
comparison, courts that have held that differential pricing did not 
violate public accommodations statutes have engaged in a balancing 
 37 See infra notes 176–213 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra Part IV. 
 39 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000); Chai R. Feldblum et al., Legal Challenges to All-Female 
Organizations, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 171, 182–83 (1986). 
 40 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996) (holding that a state 
must show exceedingly persuasive justification to  exclude women from admission at 
state-funded military academy). 
 41 See id. at 532. 
 42 See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 43 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -49 (West 2005). 
 44 See infra notes 48–80 and accompanying text. 
 45 See infra notes 48–80 and accompanying text. 
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of the alleged harm with the rights protected by the statute.46  These 
courts have been more willing to acknowledge that economic motives 
can be a legitimate reason for differential pricing and can be utterly 
devoid of any invidious, discriminatory purpose.47
A. States Prohibiting Gender-Based Differential Pricing 
1. California 
In the 1985 case of Koire v. Metro Car Wash,48 the California 
Supreme Court held that the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”),49 
California’s public accommodation statute, prohibited a number of 
car washes and one bar from offering promotional discounts to 
women without offering similar discounts to men.50  The Unruh Act 
states that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free 
and equal, and no matter what their sex . . . are entitled to the full 
and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or 
services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”51  
The court held that the Unruh Act did not apply solely to the 
exclusion of persons, but also to unequal treatment that is the result 
of a business practice.52  In support of this statement, the court 
referenced a number of extreme cases of racially-motivated, verbally 
and physically abusive behavior towards patrons, including one 
instance where a black woman seated at a soda fountain was slapped 
and had a hot cup of coffee thrown at her by white employees.53
Continuing, the court stated that it would only recognize an 
exception to the Unruh Act when public policy strongly favors such 
treatment.54  The court rejected the defendant bar owner’s argument 
that encouraging men and women to socialize was a sufficiently 
important social policy to warrant an exception to the Unruh Act.55  
In contrast to the bar owner’s argument, the court stated that strong 
public policy supported eradication of sex discrimination in any 
form.56  The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the 
 46 See infra notes 48–80 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 81–108 and accompanying text. 
 48 707 P.2d 195, 203–04 (1985). 
 49 Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 51 (West Supp. 2004). 
 50 Koire, 707 P.2d at 203–04. 
 51 CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 51. 
 52 Koire, 707 P.2d at 197. 
 53 Id. (citing Hutson v. The Owl Drug Co., 249 P. 524, 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1926)). 
 54 Id. at 198. 
 55 Id. at 199–200. 
 56 Id. at 202. 
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plaintiff was not injured in any way, and stated that the Unruh Act 
provides that any “arbitrary sex discrimination by businesses is per se 
injurious.”57
2. Pennsylvania 
In Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Dobrinoff,58 a bar was 
charged with a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act59 
for exempting female patrons from the one-dollar cover charge on a 
night when “go-go girls” were dancing at the bar.60  While the court 
acknowledged that the price difference was temporary, and that it 
“may well have been intended for purposes other than a desire to 
oppress male customers,”61 the court nonetheless held that when a 
place of public accommodation has “based the collection or 
exemption of an admission charge solely upon a difference in 
gender, having no legitimate relevance to the circumstances, then, as 
a matter of law, there is a violation of the Human Relations Act’s 
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex.”62
3. Iowa 
Iowa has also adopted a strict interpretation of its public 
accommodations statute.  In Ladd v. Iowa West Racing Ass’n,63 the 
Supreme Court of Iowa found that a “Ladies Day” promotion at a 
racetrack, where women were given free admission and discounted 
prices on concessions, discriminated against men in the furnishing of 
facilities and services in violation of Iowa’s Civil Rights Act.64  While 
the court suggested that the discrimination caused no real harm, the 
court noted that the statute did not provide a means for 
distinguishing between promotional schemes that are accidentally 
discriminatory and those that are purposely engaging in prohibited 
 57 Id. at 200.  While California’s stance in 1985 was to broadly construe the Unruh 
Act, some suggest that the application of the Act has been narrowed in subsequent 
years.  See Alison Rothi, Note and Comment, Changing Ideas About Changing Diapers, 
25 WHITTIER L. REV. 927, 956 (2004) (stating that social policy concerns have been 
considered less frequently by the current California Supreme Court in deciding cases 
under the Unruh Act, resulting in a narrow interpretation of the Act). 
 58 471 A.2d 941 (1984). 
 59 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955(i)(1) (West 1982) (current version at 43 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955 (West 2005)). 
 60 Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 471 A.2d at 942. 
 61 Id. at 943. 
 62 Id. 
 63 438 N.W.2d 600 (Iowa 1989). 
 64 Id. at 602. 
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discrimination.65  The court therefore adhered to an interpretation of 
the statute that did not require discriminatory intent, but mere 
evidence of discrimination, and found that the promotion was invalid 
under the statute.66
4. Maryland 
In Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen,67 the Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland considered an interesting scenario related to ladies’ 
night discounts.  The owner of the Woodside Delicatessen had long 
been holding ladies’ nights, but after a customer filed a complaint 
claiming that the promotion violated a county ordinance, the owner 
changed the promotion to “Skirt and Gown Night.”68  The promotion 
entitled any patron who wore either a skirt or gown on Thursday 
nights to receive a fifty-percent discount on the price of his or her 
meal.69  An administrative panel considered the complaint and found 
that the promotion violated the ordinance because it was a 
“discriminatory subterfuge, merely an extension of Ladies’ Night.”70  
The panel found that while some men had worn skirts and gowns to 
take advantage of the promotion, the majority of those arriving in 
skirts and gowns were female.71  The panel further found that the 
practice would place an undue burden on men by requiring them to 
obtain a skirt or gown, items not found in the typical male wardrobe, 
in order to obtain the discount.72  While the court seemed to 
question the gravity of the burden placed on men in this case, it 
nonetheless upheld the ruling of the panel, finding that the 
promotion violated the ordinance in question because it made a 
distinction on the basis of sex.73
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 506 A.2d 263 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986). 
 68 Id. at 264. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 264–65. 
 71 Id. at 266. 
 72 Id. at 265–66.  On appeal, the county court reversed the panel’s decision, but it 
was ultimately overturned by the Court of Special Appeals, which held that the 
county court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the administrative 
panel.  Id. 
 73 Peppin, 506 A.2d at 267 (1986). 
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5. Florida 
In City of Clearwater v. Studebaker’s Dance Club,74 a Florida District 
Court of Appeals found that a promotional membership, called the 
“Pink Ladies Club,” offering discounted drink prices to women, 
violated the City of Clearwater’s anti-discrimination ordinances.75  
Lawrence Liebling, a patron of Studebaker’s Dance Club, filed a 
complaint with the Clearwater Community Relations Board 
(“CCRB”) when his application for membership in the Pink Ladies’ 
Club was denied because he was a man.76  The CCRB found that the 
club had violated Section 99.11 of the City of Clearwater’s Code, 
which stated that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for 
any . . . place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . sex . . . 
of any person directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny 
to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or 
privileges thereof, that are afforded to other customers . . . .”77  An 
intermediate ruling overturned the decision of the CCRB, finding 
that such discrimination was “innocuous.”78  The ruling of the CCRB 
was ultimately reinstated by the Court of Appeals, however, which 
held that the previous court’s opinion that the discrimination was 
innocuous was not a proper ground for decision.79  The Florida 
District Court of Appeals did not undertake a consideration of the 
gravity, or lack thereof, of the discrimination.80
B. Gender-Based Differential Pricing Permitted 
1. Michigan 
Two Michigan cases, Magid v. Oak Park Racquet Club Associates, 
Ltd.81 and Tucich v. Dearborn Indoor Racquet Club,82 found that a 
reduced-price membership for women at a health club did not violate 
the Michigan public accommodations statute.83  In Magid, the Court 
of Appeals of Michigan determined that the Michigan public 
 74 516 So.2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
 75 Id. at 1108–09. 
 76 516 So.2d at 1107. 
 77 Id. at 1107–08 (citing CLEARWATER CODE OF ORDINANCES § 99.11 (1980) 
(repealed 1999)). 
 78 City of Clearwater, 516 So.2d at 1009. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 269 N.W.2d 661 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978). 
 82 309 N.W.2d 615 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). 
 83 Magid, 269 N.W.2d at 663; Tucich, 309 N.W.2d at 618–19. 
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accommodations statute provided a civil cause of action only in 
instances of a “refusal or denial of accommodations.”84  The court 
held that because defendants had alleged only a price difference, and 
not a refusal or denial of accommodations, they failed to state a cause 
of action and were not entitled to redress under the public 
accommodations statute.85
In Tucich, the court also found that there had been no denial of 
accommodations.86  The court analyzed the club’s advertising 
materials and found nothing in the materials that stated or implied a 
denial of services to men by the facility.87  Rather, the court found 
that the price differential was designed to encourage membership 
and make the club’s facilities more available to both sexes.88  The 
court noted that one of the motivations of the club was to encourage 
women who did not work during the day to become members in 
order to increase use of the club during daytime hours.89
2. Washington 
In MacLean v. First Northwest Industries of America, Inc.,90 the 
Supreme Court of Washington held that a basketball team’s ladies’ 
night price-ticketing practices did not constitute prohibited sex 
discrimination.91  The plaintiff attended a Seattle Sonics basketball 
game on a night when women were admitted for one-half the ticket 
price.92  The plaintiff, who purchased tickets for himself and his wife 
as well as for another couple, requested to be charged half-price for 
all tickets, but was refused.93  He subsequently brought an action 
under the state LAD,94 alleging that the price difference 
discriminated against him on the basis of sex.95  Based on the 
stadium’s evidence that women generally constituted thirty-five 
percent of attendance and the stadium wanted to increase overall 
attendance, the court found that the stadium’s motive was a 
 84 Magid, 269 N.W.2d at 663. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Tucich, 309 N.W.2d at 618–19. 
 87 Id. at 619. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 617. 
 90 635 P.2d 683 (Wash. 1981). 
 91 Id. at 688. 
 92 Id. at 684. 
 93 Id. 
 94 WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 49.60.030 (West 2002). 
 95 MacLean, 635 P.2d at 684. 
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legitimate economic motive, rather than one based on a desire to 
discriminate against men.96
Further, the court held that the LAD did not recognize the 
plaintiff’s claim because he was not denied access nor made to feel 
unwelcome.97  The court did not agree with the plaintiff’s analogy to 
a 1921 case in which an African-American man had been denied 
access to his seat in a theater, since in that case, the man was clearly 
denied access and made to feel unwelcome.98  Finally, the court 
noted that because the plaintiff was unable to show that this alleged 
discrimination had harmed him in any way, he failed to state a valid 
cause of action under the LAD.99
3. Illinois 
In The Dock Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission,100 an 
Illinois appellate court distinguished the price differential and 
motivations behind ladies’ night from prohibited forms of 
discrimination.101  The plaintiff brought the claim under the Illinois 
Dramshop Act, which served in this instance as a public 
accommodations statute in providing that “no licensee . . . shall deny 
. . . any person the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, 
advantages, facilities and privileges of any premises in which alcoholic 
liquors are authorized to be sold.”102  The court said that the crucial 
question is whether “the price differential denies persons, not able to 
obtain the lower price, the equal enjoyment of the facilities.”103  The 
court held that the patrons would only be denied equal enjoyment if 
the bar’s policy intended to, or had the effect of, discouraging men 
from patronizing the establishment.104  The court stated, however, 
that the price men were charged was the regular established price for 
drinks and was not intended to discourage their patronage.105  The 
price that women were charged was reduced to a nominal sum for 
the purpose of encouraging their patronage.106  The court suggested 
 96 Id. at 648–85. 
 97 Id. at 685–86. 
 98 Id. at 686 (citing Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co., 194 P. 813 (1921)). 
 99 Id. 
 100 428 N.E.2d 735 (Ill. App. 1981). 
 101 Id. at 738. 
 102 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, par. 133 (1979) (current version at 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. § 5/6-17 (West 1993)). 
 103 The Dock Club, Inc., 428 N.E.2d at 738 (internal quotations omitted). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
RANK FINAL.DOC 10/10/2005  9:16:41 PM 
2005] COMMENT 235 
 
that to hold the statute to prohibit a promotional discount such as 
ladies’ night would bar promotional discounts to any group, which 
the court noted was a common practice by businesses to increase 
patronage.107  Further, the court stated that the lack of litigation over 
the offering of prices to different groups indicated that “no evil 
sought to be remedied occurred here.”108
II. DE MINIMIS EXCEPTIONS IN OTHER CONTEXTS 
De minimis is defined as “of the least”109 or “trifling; minimal” 
and a fact or thing that is “so insignificant that a court may overlook 
it in deciding an issue or case.”110
The concept of a de minimis exception to a law is not a novel 
one; in fact, de minimis exceptions have been formally and 
informally recognized in a number of other contexts.111  Though 
varied, these contexts contain a general theme that the law will not 
recognize insignificant injuries, regardless of whether the literal 
interpretation of the law would suggest that there has been an actual 
violation.  Gender-based price discrimination, particularly in the 
context of ladies’ nights, should be subject to a de minimis exception. 
A. De Minimis Criminal Infractions 
The Model Penal Code includes a de minimis exception to its 
provisions.112  Section 2.12, titled “De Minimis Infractions,” provides 
that: 
The Court shall dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the 
nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the 
nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the 
defendant’s conduct: 
1) was within a customary license or tolerance, neither 
expressly negatived by the person whose interest was 
infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law 
defining the offense; or 
2) did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be 
prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an 
extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; 
or 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (8th ed. 2004). 
 110 Id. 
 111 See infra notes 112–74 and accompanying text. 
 112 MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.12 (1962). 
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3) presents such other extenuations that it cannot 
reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the legislature in 
forbidding the offense. 
The Court shall not dismiss a prosecution under Subsection (3) 
of this Section without filing a written statement of its reasons.113
The legislative history behind Section 2.12 suggests that its purpose is 
to prevent “absurd applications”114 of the criminal law and to codify 
the existing discretionary authority of prosecutors and grand juries to 
choose whether or not to prosecute a criminal case.115
Five jurisdictions, including New Jersey, have adopted Section 
2.12.116  In adopting Section 2.12, New Jersey made only one 
substantive modification, changing the words “shall dismiss” to  
“may dismiss.”117  Dismissal of de minimis infractions is therefore 
permissive, rather than mandatory, in New Jersey.  Nonetheless, the 
de minimis statute has been invoked on a number of occasions.118
In State v. Zarrilli, a 20-year-old college student was charged with 
underage consumption of alcoholic beverages on licensed premises 
for consuming one sip of beer at a church fair.119  Another patron at 
the fair was the Director of the New Jersey Division of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control.120  The Director witnessed the defendant, William 
Zarrilli, taking a sip of beer from a cup purchased by a friend.121  
Subsequently, the Director signed a municipal court complaint 
 113 Id. (emphasis added). 
 114 Stanislaw Pomorski, On Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crime, and the “De Minimis” 
Defense, 1997 BYU L. REV. 51, 52 (1997) (citing DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL PENAL 
CODE, 39 A.L.I. Proc. 61, 105–08, 226–27 (1962)). 
 115 Pomorski, supra note 114, at 52. 
 116 The five jurisdictions include four states and the territory of Guam.  HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 702-236 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 12 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN.  
§ 2C:2-11 (West 1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 312 (West 1998); GUAM CODE ANN. 
tit. 9, § 7.67 (Westlaw through P.L. 28-037 (2005)). 
 117 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-11 (West 1995).  The New Jersey statute also removes the 
requirement under subsection (3) of the Model Penal Code that the court must file a 
written statement of its reasons for finding that the charge would be contrary to 
legislative intent.  Id.  It also adds a requirement that the prosecutor be given notice 
and an opportunity to be heard, and a right to appeal.  Id.  In addition, New Jersey 
vests the authority of dismissing the case in the “assignment judge,” rather than the 
“Court.”  Id.; MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.12 (1962). 
 118 See, e.g., State v. Bazin, 912 F. Supp. 106, 115 (D.N.J. 1995); State v. Zarrilli, 523 
A.2d 284, 289 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987); State v. Nevens, 485 A.2d 345, 348 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); State v. Smith, 480 A.2d 236, 241  
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984). 
 119 Zarrilli, 523 A.2d at 285. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
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charging Zarrilli with the offense.122  The Superior Court of New 
Jersey stated that the correct test in applying the de minimis statute is 
to determine the risk of harm to society caused by a defendant’s 
conduct.123  Applying the facts, the court found that the “harm to 
society caused or threatened by [the defendant’s] conduct was so 
minimal as not to warrant the condemnation of a conviction.”124  The 
complaint was dismissed on the grounds that it was de minimis.125
In State v. Bazin,126  the New Jersey District Court dismissed a 
charge of harassment under the de minimis statute.127  In a criminal 
action brought by a private citizen,128 the citizen charged United 
States Postal Service inspector Michael Bazin with harassment.129  
Bazin had been in the process of investigating a theft of $70,000 in 
cash from the Trenton Post Office that occurred in May 1995, and 
sought to conduct polygraph tests on workers who had been present 
on the day of the theft.130  One worker, Edgar Paulus, arrived for his 
polygraph test with his union representative, Evette Utley-Williams.131  
Upon Williams’ advice, Paulus refused to take the test, and a 30-
minute argument with the defendant followed.132  When Paulus and 
Williams rose to leave, the defendant stated in a sarcastic manner, “I 
want to thank you for all of your cooperation in this investigation.  
Just remember, what goes around, comes around.”133  Williams asked 
Bazin if the statement was a threat and Bazin responded by slamming 
his office door, hitting Williams.134  Williams then asked Bazin, “So, 
you are going to be violent, too?” and Bazin responded, “I would if I 
could.”135  The court found that, though Bazin’s statements were not 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Zarilli, 523 A.2d at 289. 
 126 912 F. Supp. 106 (D.N.J. 1995). 
 127 Id. at 114. 
 128 The United States Attorney’s Office, the Hamilton Township Prosecutor, the 
Mercer County Prosecutor, and the New Jersey Attorney General’s office all refused 
to prosecute the case.  Id. at 109.  Complainant retained the firm of Stark & Stark to 
prosecute the action on behalf of the State of New Jersey.  Id. 
 129 Bazin was also charged with simple assault, but that charge did not factor into 
the court’s discussion of the de minimis statute.  Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Bazin, 912 F. Supp. at 109. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id.  Williams brought assault charges, alleging that the slamming of the door 
was meant to cause her physical harm.  Id. at 109.  The de minimis exclusion in this 
case concerns only the harassment charges.  Id. at 115. 
 135 Id. at 109. 
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professional or pleasant, they did not rise to the level of 
harassment.136  In fact, the court noted, his statement that he would 
use violence “if he could” demonstrated that he did not intend to 
violate the law.137  The court granted the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss the harassment charge on de minimis grounds.138
B. De Minimis Copyright Infringement 
Copyright law also includes a de minimis standard, applied in 
the area of “music sampling.”139  Music sampling is the practice of 
using previous sound recordings to create new music,140 and it is 
particularly common in the rap and hip-hop genres.141  The issue that 
arises with music sampling is the question of how much of an existing 
song can be used before the sampling has infringed on the existing 
copyright.  Generally, if a plaintiff has a copyright in a work, such as a 
song, any expression substantially similar to that work constitutes an 
infringement.142  If the use of the copyrighted work is de minimis, 
however, or so trivial “as to fall below the qualitative threshold of 
substantial similarity,”143 the use is not actionable.144  In determining 
whether the use meets the qualitative threshold of substantial 
similarity, courts will look to whether the portion appropriated was 
“much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, or the heart of 
the work.”145
C. De Minimis Exception for Overtime Salary Owed to Employee 
A de minimis rule is also recognized in the context of overtime 
salary.146  Under the Fair Labor Standards Act,147 employers are 
 136 Id. at 114. 
 137 Bazin, 912 F.Supp. at 114. 
 138 Id. at 115. 
 139 David S. Blessing, Note, Who Speaks Latin Anymore?: Translating De Minimis Use 
for Application to Music Copyright Infringement and Sampling, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2399, 2409–10 (2004); Josh Norek, “You Can’t Sing Without the Bling”: The Toll of 
Excessive Sample License Fees on Creativity in Hip-Hop Music and the Need for a Compulsory 
Sound Recording Sample License System, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 83, 87 (2004). 
 140 Blessing, supra note 139, at 2403. 
 141 Norek, supra note 139, at 86–87 (discussing the development of music 
sampling in rap and hip-hop music). 
 142 Blessing, supra note 139, at 2407. 
 143 Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing 
Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
 144 Norek, supra note 139, at 87. 
 145 Id. at 88 (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946)). 
 146 Amanda M. Riley, The De Minimis Rule: Trifles of Time, 45 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 
18, 18 (Nov. 2003). 
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required to pay overtime salary to employees who work beyond a 
forty-hour work week.148  When the extra time is a matter of a few 
minutes, however, courts have held that such time is de minimis and 
need not be recorded.149  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, in Lindow v. United States,150 established a balancing test 
to determine whether compensable time is de minimis.151  In that 
case, employees had spent an average of seven to eight minutes 
reading a log book and exchanging information with each other 
regarding what had occurred on previous shifts, though their 
employer had not required them to do so and the discussions did not 
occur at regular times or intervals.152  The court considered “(1) the 
practical administrative difficulty of recording the additional time; 
(2) the aggregate amount of compensable time; and (3) the 
regularity of the additional work.”153  While taking into account the 
effect of denying an employee his pay, the test also considers the 
difficulties of recording small amounts of time.154  On the other hand, 
those difficulties are considered less important when the employee 
has worked for a longer period of time beyond his scheduled work 
hours, or when he has consistently worked a small amount of time 
beyond his scheduled hours.  Under the facts of Lindow, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the amounts of overtime were too insignificant 
when compared with the administrative burden of recording short 
periods of time.155
D. De Minimis Environmental Law Violations 
A de minimis standard has also been established by Congress 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act (CERCLA).156  Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to 
 147 29 U.S.C. § 201, et. seq. (2000). 
 148 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2000). 
 149 Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946) (“When the 
matter in issue concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the 
scheduled working hours, such trifles may be disregarded.”); see, e.g., Lindow v. 
United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 150 738 F.2d 1057. 
 151 Id. at 1063. 
 152 Id. at 1060. 
 153 Id. at 1063. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1063. 
 156 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) (2000); see Monica Shah Desai, Disposing of United 
States v. CDMG Realty Co.: The Case Against the Application of CERCLA Liability for De 
Minimis Disturbances of Pre-Existing Contamination, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 200, 203–11 
(1997). 
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clean up leaking, inactive, or abandoned hazardous waste sites.157  
The theory behind CERCLA is restitution: those responsible for 
causing the release of hazardous substances should pay the costs of 
cleanup.158  CERCLA imposes, in general, strict liability on those 
responsible for the release of hazardous substances.159
Congress has, however, acknowledged that defendants who have 
contributed a de minimis amount of contamination should be 
treated differently than other CERCLA defendants.160  For purposes 
of settlement, defendants who have caused de minimis amounts of 
contamination and who agree to settle with the government are 
protected from certain claims.161  The purpose behind this provision 
is to provide an opportunity for de minimis contaminators to settle 
their claims instead of engaging in protracted legal proceedings; 
evidence showed that in many cases, such defendants were subject to 
higher legal fees and other transactional fees than their ultimate 
liability for cleanup at a given site.162  The definition of de minimis 
under CERCLA is not a fixed number; instead, a determination of 
whether contamination is de minimis rests on a comparison with the 
total amount of hazardous materials in the site.163
E. De Minimis Employment Discrimination 
The concept of de minimis discrimination has been recognized 
in the employment discrimination context for decades.164  Sex-based 
 157 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675, as reauthorized and substantially amended by the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”), Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986); John C. Cruden, CERCLA Overview, SH093 ALI-ABA 555, 
561 (2003).  CERCLA was enacted in response to severe environmental and health 
problems at abandoned toxic waste sites such as Love Canal in New York and Times 
Beach in Missouri.  Id. 
 158 Cruden, supra note 157, at 562. 
 159 Desai, supra note 156, at 203. 
 160 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) (2000); Desai, supra note 156, at 208–09. 
 161 Desai, supra note 156, at 208–09. 
 162 Id. at 210–11. 
 163 Id. at 209–11; 
[T]he President shall as promptly as possible reach a final settlement 
with a potentially responsible party . . . if such settlement involves only 
a minor portion of the response costs at the facility concerned . . . 
[and] (A) both of the following are minimal in comparison to other 
hazardous substances at the facility: (i) The amount of hazardous 
substances contributed by that party to the facility. (ii) The toxic or 
other hazardous effects of the substances contributed by that party to 
the facility. 
42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 164 Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L. J. 1121, 1122 
(1998). 
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differences in workplace dress and grooming codes are accepted as 
permissible forms of discrimination.165  Generally, courts have upheld 
dress and grooming codes that differentiate between male and 
female employees.166  An employer’s policy is likely to be upheld 
when its rationale is nondiscriminatory and supported by facts.167  
Examples include employer’s public image, safety concerns, 
enhancing employee morale and productivity, and conforming to 
generally accepted community standards of dress and appearance.168
Some scholars note a movement to broaden the scope of de 
minimis exceptions in the context of employment discrimination 
claims.169  In light of an increasing volume of cases in the courts, 
some of which are perceived as “frivolous,” there is a trend to limit 
discrimination claims to those that have the most merit, and where 
an employee has truly suffered harm.170  Many circuit courts have 
begun to require that, for a claim of discrimination to be actionable 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,171 the plaintiff 
demonstrate a materially adverse action or effect, in addition to 
demonstrating the existence of discrimination itself.172  Thus, an 
employee must show that he or she suffered a tangible effect, usually 
economic, in his or her employment as a result of the discrimination.  
Essentially, the employee must have been fired or otherwise have lost 
wages, through a demotion or other action.173  While the details of 
this developing doctrine are complicated174 and thus beyond the 
scope of this Comment, the trend suggests that courts are willing to 
 165 White, supra note 164, at 1122, n.1 (noting that employers are permitted to 
establish different dress and grooming standards without violating Title VII). 
 166 Marc Koonin, Avoiding Claims of Discrimination Based on Personal Appearance, 
Grooming, and Hygiene Standards, 15 LAB. LAW. 19, 23 (1999); see, e.g., Willingham v. 
Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 167 Koonin, supra note 166, at 21. 
 168 Id. at 21–23. 
 169 White, supra note 164, at 1124–25. 
 170 Id. at 1124 (stating that “courts are understandably reluctant to permit 
disgruntled employees to make a case out of every workplace situation arguably 
motivated by a worker’s race, sex, or complaints of discrimination”). 
 171 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).  The Act prohibits employment discrimination based 
on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.  Id.  
 172 White, supra note 164, at 1124. 
 173 See, e.g., Lederberger v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting 
that a “purely lateral transfer” where the employee is not demoted in substance or in 
form, does not constitute a materially adverse employment action). 
 174 White, supra note 164, at 1126 (noting that there is a “real and growing 
disarray concerning which improperly motivated employment decisions are legally 
actionable . . . [as well as] confusion over whether material adversity is a statutory 
requirement or is only a necessary element for a prima facie case of disparate 
treatment”). 
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consider claims of discrimination only when plaintiffs can 
demonstrate that they were tangibly and materially harmed by the 
discrimination.175
F. Summary 
As the above examples demonstrate, de minimis exceptions are 
recognized in a number of contexts.  Despite the varied subject 
matter, the common theme running through these exceptions is that 
an act will be considered de minimis when it fails to cause the harm 
sought to be prevented by a particular law.  As has been recognized 
most recently in the employment discrimination context, limiting 
recovery to when a person is tangibly harmed by the discrimination 
serves an important efficiency purpose by limiting the number of 
frivolous claims.  Public accommodation laws, which were enacted to 
curtail overt, hostile acts of discrimination, should not apply to 
gender-based differential pricing when such pricing is the result of 
legitimate, good-faith economic motives.  A de minimis exception is 
warranted in the context of ladies’ nights, because while they do 
violate the literal interpretation of many public accommodation 
statutes, the motive behind them is simply not what state legislatures 
intended to prevent by enacting such laws. 
III. STIGMATIC HARM AND GENDER-BASED DIFFERENTIAL PRICING 
The injury asserted by plaintiffs such as David Gillespie is 
essentially one of stigma.  Assuming that the nominal difference 
between the price a man would pay to attend a ladies’ night and the 
price a woman would pay is, in fact, a de minimis injury, the 
remaining claim is that the male plaintiffs are stigmatized on the 
basis of their gender.  This Part discusses whether a plaintiff may 
successfully argue that he suffered a stigmatic injury as a result of 
being denied a gender-based price discount, concluding that 
stigmatic injury is not a viable claim. 
Generally, male plaintiffs challenging ladies’ night argue that by 
charging men more, an establishment is expressing that men are less 
welcome, and is thus discriminating against men in the furnishing of 
a public accommodation by treating men as second-class citizens.176  
 175 Id. at 1124, 1126. 
 176 See Mark M. Hager, Essay: Sex in the Original Position: A Restatement of Liberal 
Feminism, 14 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 181, 213 (1999) (stating that ladies’ night is 
“innocuous fun” that could only be compared to real discrimination by “wooden 
analogy”). 
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This argument, however, is fundamentally flawed.177  There is no 
parallel comparison between an event such as ladies’ night, where 
reduced prices for women are used as an incentive to increase female 
patronage as well as overall patronage, and one where a group is 
expressly excluded.178  Ladies’ night, since it does not discourage men 
from attending, is nearly the opposite of what a “whites’ night” or 
“blacks’ night” would mean.179  Rather, ladies’ night is based on the 
harmless observation that women are less likely to frequent bars than 
men.  Relying on basic economic notions of supply and demand,180 
bar and restaurant owners resort to discounts in order to increase 
their overall number of customers. 
A. Stigmatic Harm 
Stigmatic harm occurs when a given act or policy stigmatizes a 
person or group by sending a message that a difference renders that 
person or group inferior.181
It “implies more than merely being referred to by a racial epithet 
or even the denial of a particular opportunity . . . . It involves 
becoming a disfavored or dishonored individual in the eyes of society, 
a kind of social outcast whose stigmatized attribute stands as a barrier 
to full acceptance into the wider community.”182
Stigma has most frequently been recognized and developed by 
the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
jurisprudence.  While the issue of stigmatic injury under public 
accommodation statutes does not involve constitutional questions, 
the concept serves as an analogy to explain why gender-based 
differential pricing does not cause stigmatic harm. 
 177 Id. (“Ladies’ night disparages neither males nor females except under the most 
contrived interpretation . . . . [S]ome men and women like going where it is easy to 
meet.”). 
 178 Cf. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (holding that total 
exclusion of women from membership of organization violated public 
accommodation statute and was not protected by constitutional right of expressive 
association); see Chapman, Editorial, supra note 8, at 13A (arguing that ladies’ night is 
not the result of a “deep-seated hostility toward men, perpetuating centuries of 
oppression,” but instead exists because women are “generally less attracted to the bar 
scene”). 
 179 Hager, supra note 176, at 182. 
 180 Joyce Howard Price, ‘Ladies Night’ Ruled Discriminatory: Bar Owners Contend Men 
Benefit Most From Incentives to Women, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), June 3, 2004, at A12. 
 181 R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV.  803, 803 (2004). 
 182 Id. at 809. 
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The seminal Supreme Court case addressing stigmatic harm is 
Brown v. Board of Education.183  In that case, the Court held that 
racially segregated schools violated the Equal Protection Clause 
because a separate education was inherently unequal.184  In reaching 
its conclusion, the Court relied on social science research discussing 
the effect of segregation on black children.185  The Court found that 
the effect was severe, stating that “to separate [the children] from 
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race 
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community 
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone.”186  The exclusion of black children from the schools caused 
grave harm by stigmatizing the children as less worthy. 
In order to violate the Equal Protection Clause, a government 
action must not merely run the risk of causing someone to feel 
stigmatized, but it also must have a discriminatory motive or intent 
behind it.187  Stigma also appears to presume that the person or 
group claiming stigmatization is actually part of a historically 
disfavored group.188  It is here that the male plaintiffs’ claims fail.  
First, there is no evil intent or discriminatory motive behind gender-
based discounts such as ladies’ night.  In fact, quite the opposite is 
true.189  Second, no case has identified plausible grounds as to how, 
and in what way, such plaintiffs were stigmatized.  Rather, some 
courts have recognized that no harm occurred as a result of the 
discount, but nonetheless were bound by strict statutory wording.190
 183 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 184 Id. at 495. 
 185 Id. at 494 & n.11. 
 186 Id. at 494. 
 187 Lenhardt, supra note 181, at 875 (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 
(1993)).  Shaw v. Reno described stigma as a result of an intentional race-based 
classification.  Id. 
 188 Lenhardt, supra note 181, at 850.  The author compared hypothetical 
situations in which a student is accused of only being admitted to Harvard because 
she was black, as opposed to because she was white, or a legacy, or was from a certain 
geographical region of the country.  Id.  He concluded that the accusation regarding 
race carries the greatest impact because there is a presumption of black inferiority in 
our society, whereas there is no such presumption regarding the other categories.  
Id. 
 189 Hager, supra note 176, at 214 (stating that many men and women enjoy going 
out where it is easy to meet, and arguing that ladies’ night disparages men under 
only the most contrived interpretation). 
 190 See supra notes 7, 48–80, and accompanying text for a discussion of various 
courts’ failure to find any true harm caused to male plaintiffs by ladies’ night 
discounts. 
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B. Gender-Based Differential Pricing Is Not Stigmatizing 
In Koire v. Metro Car Wash,191 the California Supreme Court stated 
that gender-based price discrimination is “per se injurious.”192  The 
problem, however, is that such pricing is not at all similar to other 
forms of discrimination, making the blanket claim of injury difficult 
to sustain.  When comparing ladies’ night to an instance of total 
exclusion from a public accommodation, the need for a de minimis 
exception becomes clear; sex-based price discounts simply pale in 
comparison to overt, hostile acts of discrimination.193
In Gillespie,194 the ALJ found a violation of the LAD because the 
bar discriminated against a person in the “furnishing of” a public 
accommodation.195  In support of this proposition, it cited two New 
Jersey cases: Turner v. Wong196 and Franek v. Tomahawk Lake Resort.197  
These cases, however, are not parallel to the ladies’ night cases 
because they involved outright denials of service and overt acts that 
caused the plaintiffs to feel unwelcome, whereas the events in Gillespie 
did not involve conduct intended to make any person or group feel 
unwelcome. 
In Franek, an eighty-three-year-old, wheelchair-bound woman was 
using the defendant’s recreational facility.198  The woman’s daughter 
spoke with the facility’s operator in order to request access to a 
separate entrance, and the operator stated that he did not “want 
those kind [sic] of people here.”199  While the disabled woman did 
not hear the initial conversation, she later learned of the details.200  
Feeling unwelcome and unhappy to be at the facility, she and her 
daughter left earlier than they had intended.201  She never returned 
to the facility and died before her case went to trial.202  The Superior 
 191 707 P.2d 195 (1985). 
 192 Id. at 200. 
 193 McClements & Thomas, supra note 15, at 1618 (“The importance of a male not 
being able to buy a drink, attend a basketball game, or get his car washed for the 
same price as a female pales in comparison to someone not being able to obtain 
housing or employment because of his race or sex.”). 
 194 Gillespie v. J.C.B.C. Inc., No. CRT 2579-03, 2004 WL 1476932 at *8  
(N.J. Admin. June 10, 2004). 
 195 Id. 
 196 832 A.2d 340 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003). 
 197 754 A.2d 1237 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). 
 198 Id. at 1239. 
 199 Id. at 1240. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
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Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, held that the statements 
made by the operator violated the LAD.203  The court stated that 
it is unquestionably a violation of the LAD for the owner or 
operator of a public accommodation to tell a person, either 
directly or indirectly, that his or her patronage is not welcome 
because of a trait or condition which the LAD protects from 
discriminatory action, even though use of the facility on the 
particular occasion is not denied.204
The court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant.205   
In Turner, Delois Turner purchased a donut and a cup of coffee 
from Nancy Wong’s store.206  When Turner complained that the 
donut was stale and requested a new one, Wong allegedly called 
Turner a “black nigger from Philadelphia.”207  Wong repeated the 
phrase three or four times in front of the other customers, who were 
all white, and then continued, yelling, “You black niggers come in 
here, give me a hard time.  White people don’t give me a hard time.  
White people nice people.”208  When Turner asked where she could 
find a phone, Wong told plaintiff to get out of her store.209  The 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, found that the 
statements made by Wong were intended to force Turner to leave the 
store and to make her feel unwelcome to return.210  Relying on 
Franek, the court stated that the protections of the LAD are not 
limited merely to where there is an outright denial of the use of a 
facility or the services thereof, but also to situations in which a 
customer is discouraged from using a public accommodation because 
of his or her protected status under the LAD.211  Further, the court 
stated that the “focal issue” in such cases is whether the defendant 
acted with an “actual or apparent design to discourage present or 
future use of the public accommodation by plaintiff on account of 
[his or] her protected status.”212  As in Franek, the court reversed the 
trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, 
 203 Franek, 754 A.2d at 1243. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. at 1243–44. 
 206 Turner, 832 A.2d at 345–46. 
 207 Id. at 346. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. at 355. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Turner, 832 A.2d at 356. 
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and remanded for a factual determination of what Wong had actually 
said.213
When Turner and Franek are compared to Gillespie, a striking 
difference is clear.  The plaintiffs in Turner and Franek were made to 
feel as if, based on their protected status, their present and future use 
of a public accommodation was unwelcome.  David Gillespie, 
however, was not discouraged from patronizing Coastline.  Because 
gender-based pricing is not based on an animus toward one gender 
or the other, it is not stigmatizing.  It is not the type of harm that state 
legislatures intended to remedy through the enactment of public 
accommodations laws. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Gender-based differential pricing, particularly in the context of 
ladies’ night discounts, is de minimis and should not be considered 
violative of public accommodation laws.  The effort by the New Jersey 
legislature to amend the LAD to recognize a de minimis exception 
correctly recognizes that not all instances of discrimination should 
form the basis for a legal challenge.  The de minimis price 
differences involved in gender-based discounts are similar to other 
areas where de minimis exceptions have been recognized and 
embraced.  Most importantly, a de minimis exception would serve an 
important efficiency purpose by reserving the statutory cause of 
action under the LAD to those cases where actual discrimination has 
occurred.  Male plaintiffs such as David Gillespie have suffered no 
tangible injury and have been wrongfully afforded a statutory cause of 
action where there should be none.  Public accommodation laws, 
which were enacted to remedy instances of overt, hostile 
discrimination against racial groups, should not be invoked in this 
manner. 
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